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A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON GROUP 
RANCHING IN NAROK DISTRICT 
by 
Deborah Ann Doherty 
ABSTRACT 
This initial report constitutes an effort to provide background data 
on the technical and administrative measures involved during the implementation 
of group ranching in Narok District of Kenya Maasailand. 
As part of this report, I have outlined many of the social, political, 
and economic constraints impinging on ranch development and briefly examined 
some of the ways in which the costs and benefits of group ranch development are 
affecting the interests of various segments of Narok Maasai. 
Maasai stockowners are, of necessity, making certain adjustments in 
herd management practices, although these adjustments are not always consistent 
with the aims of ranch development planners; nor are these adjustments necessarily 
in the best interests of the Narok Maasai in general. Preliminary investigation 
shows that, rather than facilitating economic development without disenfranchising 
large numbers of people, group ranching, together with the introduction of wheat 
cropping, is stimulating feelings of insecurity among many Maasai herders that 
they will be eventually forced out of the pastoral economy. This report attempts 
to delve into the reasons underlying this insecurity by offering ethnographic 
data concerning inter- and intra-group ranch rivalries; inter-generational 
conflict; land use controversies; and points out problem areas which I intend 
to investigate more fully during my period of research tenure in Narok District. 
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Introduction; 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a background to group 
ranching in Narok District of Kenya Maasailand and to outline some of the 
social, political, and economic factors impinging on this ranching develop-
ment scheme. 
Historically, attention was first given to problems in the pastoral 
regions of Kenya as early as the 1930!s when the British Colonial government 
became concerned over what was regarded as rapidly deteriorating rangeland. 
Unfortunately, the British viewed this deterioration only as a consequence of 
overstocking and not as the effects of an increasing maladjustment of traditional 
pastoral systems struggling for survival in the face of ever-increasing 
agricultural encroachment. As a result, not only did such colonial development 
schemes as cull, branding and grazing/quota programs exacerbate the already 
injurious effects on the environment by placing an increased burden on range-
land not covered by their schemes, but these schemes also met with much 
hostility from the pastoralists (Jacobs 1975). 
During the more recent post-colonial period, it has been Kenya's 
national policy to establish freehold title to land with the most desireable 
format for pastoral regional development being some pattern of individual and 
group ranches. It is hoped that individual and group titles will provide 
people with the incentive to practice range conservation - a practice which 
was considered inadequate under traditional communal ownership. Furthermore, 
establishing freehold title to land seems to be justified since it appears 
that commercial banks and other lending institutions will not make loans or 
extend credit for development without the security of registered land titles. 
In fact, the World Bank insisted early on that '"registration is a prerequisite 
of the range development programme . . . without the certainty of ownership 
and the clear right of the group to exclude outsiders, which is provided by 
registration, no agency would be prepared to lend money for range development" 
(Lawrance Report 1966: 131). 
As might be expected, this policy of establishing freehold title to 
land gave rise to attempts by several Maasai sections to re-establish their 
traditional boundaries and localities. In Kajiado District, for example, all 
of the Kaputiei section's land was divided into individual and group ranches 
by the mid-1960's and range development was being financed by the Livestock 
Development Project, Phase I (1969-1974). Nevertheless, research recently 
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conducted in Kajiado District indicates that, except for the Poka Ranch (which 
must be considered atypical due to its highly favourable ecological conditions), 
the ecological viability of most of these ranches is dubious. In fact, during 
the last drought, herders moved their livestock to areas of known grazing and 
the new group ranch boundaries presented no obstacle to these movements 
(Halderman 1972: 7). In effect then, semi-nomadism continues to be practiced 
on the Kaputiei ranches and, probably due to the slowness of infrastructural 
improvements, the ability to promote a sedentary life-style on these ranches 
only becomes possible during exceptionally wet years. 
One of the major effects of group and individual ranching in this 
region has been increased fractionalism, mainly because the ranches were not 
established on the basis of any traditional, or familiar, sociological 
unit - a unit which could provide a basis for common action. Indeed, "the 
lack of short-term benefits resulted in the creation of factions and 
difficulties in cooperation1'' (Hedlund 1971: 9). Furthermore, it has been 
noted that individual ranchers stand apart as a class of educated political 
and economic leaders and that the support they muster among group ranch 
members further leads to hostilities and the polarization of groups. Tradi-
tional age-set leaders are losing their positions of leadership and group 
ranch representatives are being chosen from among the ranks of young, educated 
men. Here, Davis (1971:28) has noted the rise of a young, entrepreneurial 
class which is in competition with older, more traditional stockowners. 
A further ramification of land registration in Kajiado District is 
that, rather than making the pastoral Maasai position more secure, this 
policy has made the former "section'"' lands more disposable and has increased 
the possibility of these lands being transferred to people from outside the 
section, either directly through private sales or indirectly by section members 
defaulting on development loans. More specifically, reference can be made 
to the' misunderstanding of the implications and responsibilities stemming from 
individual land tenure in the "Ngong area where a registration of land to 
individual Maasai has resulted in the immediate sale to Kikuyu farmers and 
consequent loss of the land to the Maasai tribe, probably forever11' (Lawrance 
Report 1966: 25). 
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Certainly there are similarities and differences in the ways that 
ranching has impacted, and continues to impact, on stockowners in Kajiado 
and Narok Districts and these remain to be more fully investigated. However, 
I hope this paper will shed some preliminary light on the subject and, by 
focusing attention solely on ranching in Narok District, point out some of 
the dangers inherent in making both cross-cultural generalizations and intra-
cultural generalizations. 
Group Ranching in Narok District: 
(1) Ecological Features of Narok District. Narok District covers 
2 
an area of 18,500 Km. The district is bounded on the east by the Nkuruman 
Escarpment which is the western wall of the Rift Valley, to the west of the 
escarpment are the Loita Hills rising to a height of 2,670 m. and gradually 
merging with the Siana Plains. Further to the west is Mara country and the 
Loita Plains which lie between 1,500 and 2,100 m. To the north, the Mau 
Escarpment rises to 3,030 m.a while west of the Siria Escarpment, the 
Transmara lies at between 1,500 and 1,800 m. gradually merging into the foot-
hills of the Kisii Highlands. 
The average rainfall in Narok District is bi~modal, varying from 
some 380 mm. in the southeast to more than 1,780 mm. in the northwestern 
Mau area. The contrast between wet and dry seasons is less obvious in the 
western corner of the district. 
According to Pratt et al (1966), the vegetation types found in 
Narok District are: (1) Bushland; (2) Woodland; (3) Grassland; (4-) Dwarfshrub 
Grassland*, and, (5) Forest. These types of vegetation are distributed in 
three major ecological zones with distinct climates, viz., (a) humid - dry 
humid; (b) dry humid - semi-arid; and, (c) semi-arid. Due to this ecological 
variation, planners have designated three areas for development in Narok 
District. These are as follows: (1) High potential areas such as Mau and 
Transmara; (2) Semi-marginal areas such as Lower Mau where mixed agriculture/ 
pastoralism is possible; and, (3) Marginal areas which are only suitable for 
pastoralism. These basic land use zones based on ecological criteria can be 
seen in Fig. 1. below (Narok District Development Plan 1972). 
(2) Land Adjudication. Land adjudication and the introduction of 
group ranching is being carried out in Narok District within the framework 
of the Livestock Development Project, Phase II (1974-1979). As was the case 
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Fig. 1 Land Use Zones of Narok 
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in Kajiado District, the land adjudication process establishes the boundaries 
for each group ranch and enables the male members within each ranch to be 
registered as owners and incorporated under the Land (Group Representatives) 
Act. This process involves electing a number of group representatives who 
function as the legal trustees for the corporation and are authorized to receive 
loans, acquire debts, etc. on behalf of the ranch corporation. A second level 
of authority on each ranch is the elected group ranch committee. This committee 
is -composed of a chairman, secretary, treasurer, and seven members-
at-large which represent the ranch managerial group. 
The aims of the group ranching scheme in Narok District, as expre'ssed 
by officials from the local Ranch Planning Office are: (1) to prevent over-
grazing through an on-ranch system of rational rotational grazing; (2) to prevent 
the spread of contagious cattle diseases through the systematic use of dips, 
vaccination, and quarantine; (3) to guarantee a regular offtake of beef cattle 
and an increase in milk production through the introduction of grade stock; 
(4) to establish herds whose numbers are in direct proportion to the carrying 
capacity of the rangeland and market demands; and, (5) to deliver and administer1 
development loans to interested stockowners. 
Group ranches in Narok District (hereafter known as the district) are 
able to finance the development of a ranchi.ng infrastructure in four (4) ways: 
(1) request an Agriculture Finance Corporation (A.F.C.) loan; 
(2) through monies gained from leasing .land to wheat/barley growers; 
(3) through monies gained from leasing land for tented tourist camps; 
(4) through monies gained from livestock offtake. 
While it is still too early to say whether the objectives of commercial 
ranching will be achieved in the district, it is obvious that the impact of land 
registration is considerable and that this has stimulated various responses from 
the local Maasai. In order to examine this relationship more closely, I want 
to give some attention to the four ways ranch development can be financed and 
what these mean to different segments of Maasai society. 
The Cost of Development or Who Takes an A.F.C. Loan? 
Under this option, ranchers are given financial support through a ten-
year loan which is repayable at 11% interest per annum. These loans are repaid 
according to the number of cattle each member of the ranch own, i.e., wealthy 
stockowners pay a comparatively higher rate than poor stockowners. It is hoped 
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that the obligation to repay such loans will lead to an increased cattle 
offtake on each ranch. 
Although more than sixty (60) group ranches, plus numerous 
individual ranches, have been registered in the district s fewer than 
fifteen have been fully incorporated and then gone on to request or take 
out development loans. At the time this paper was written, the group 
ranches which have applied for and/or accepted A.F.C. loans aredas follows: 
Ranch Name Area (ha.) Membership 
Nkairamiram 4-s 375 78 
Keiyan 891 44-
Olkeri 998 18 
Moryo Narok 1,574 18 
Ilmashariani 4,993 75 
Olomisimis 9,640 180 
Olaimutiai 3,726 18 
Lemek 62,897 n.a. 
Koyiaki 87,728 290 
Olkinyei 78,725 195 
The ranches mentioned above are particularly interesting because 
they illustrate many of the problems and conflicts which ranchers who opt 
for development face when it comes to measuring the costs involved against 
the benefits to be gained. For example, Maasai have a keen sense for 
recognizing if they are being taken advantage of and many ranch members have 
reported that they are being charged higher prices than usual when they 
purchase building materials, medicine for cattle, and so on. Because of this, 
they worry that any development funds would be quickly spent without much 
to show for it and then they would be foreced to sell livestock to repay their 
loan. In fact, some Maasai worry that they might become destitute if they 
have to sell too many of their stock. Consequently, rather than regarding 
.infrastructural development as a means of increasing ranch security, many 
Maasai describe it as a "plot" to place them heavily into debt with the result 
that their land will be sold to "outsiders". Besides this particular fear, 
other factors enter into the decision whether or not to take out a development 
loan. This can be illustrated by the following example. 
7 -
Nkairamiram Group Ranch recently voted 13 - 5 in favour of accepting 
a loan to provide for water development, breeding bulls, and dip construction. 
The loan was approved with the condition that the five opposing members would 
be exempt from repayment. These five members where not representative of either 
the wealthy or the poor stockowners, but rather, can best be described as 
average. These men argued that they were rejecting the loan because they did 
not want to finance any improvements for poor herders who would contribute 
little to the repayment of the loan. Nor did they want to support wealthy 
herders who, they felt, would benefit most from graded breeding bulls. 
Interestingly enough, however, these five individuals are all members of other 
group ranches and some of them have private holdings in Mau. At the other 
extreme, the neighbouring ranch, Oldonyo Rasha, has even refused to incorporate 
and members of the ranch committee also have individual holdings in Mau. 
Certainly this kind of decision-making requires considerable further 
investigation. One cannot simply extrapolate an immediate and causal correla-
tion between permanent ranch members and those with interests elsewhere and 
the kinds of decisions each makes with regards to development loans. This 
becomes readily apparent when looking at Ilmashax^iani Group Ranch where men 
elected to the group ranch committee also keep wheat shambas in Mau. However, 
unlike the opposing five members at Nkairamiram, these individuals are 
considered to be the driving force towards obtaining a loan for their group 
ranch. Furthermore, these individuals are not the wealthiest stockowners on 
their ranch since they have sold numerous cattle in order to develop their 
wheat shambas. In contrast to this last case, another ranch, Morijo Narok, voted 
out their chairman because he opposed taking out a development loan and was known 
to be developing his interests in Kajiado District. In this situation an election 
placed new individuals on the ranch committee and a loan was soon accepted to 
build dip facilities on the ranch. 
Another variable which is readily apparent in the district is that 
certain ranches have a high penetration of non-Maasai acceptees v/ith whom they 
often intermarry. The Purko Maasai, especially in Mau Narok, are heavily inter-
married with Kikuyu, while Maasai in western Narok District (i.e., the Uasin 
Gishu and Moitanik) are intermarried with Luyia, Nandi, and other Kalenjin 
peoples (cf. King 1971). Due to the insecurities stemming from land registration, 
many of these aliens firmly deny that they have no right to be members of a 
group ranch and, in fact, to sidestep this issue many of them have taken steps 
to be adopted into a Maasai family. The issue of these people's "Maasainess" 
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aside, it is important to recognize that they do have considerable influence, 
not only in building up individual shambas, opting for education, etc., but 
als oj xn those cases where they have been successful in being registered on 
a group ranch, they do influence decisions on whether to accept development 
loans, In fact, some Maasai informants suggest that loans officers sometimes 
favour ranchers who can establish kin ties with them and that some ranches 
with development loans have many non-Maasai registered members. In case, 
like this, the Maasai often refer to the holdings as "Kikuyu ranches". These 
few facts aside, however, the question remains for further investigation: To 
what extent do acceptees actually influence decision-making on Maasai group 
ranches?. 
It is also wcrthmentioning that on some ranches in the district, 
young educated Maasai have gained influential positions on ranching committees, 
similar to what has already occurred in Kajiado District. Alternatively, other 
ranches still elect traditional leaders to their ranching committees, but appoint 
an educated man to the secretary's position. This is purely a token gesture, 
however, since the educated man will be directed by a traditional leader. In 
light of this, the extent to which educated men make their influence and knowledge 
felt on group ranches in general is debatable. For example, following a recent 
hoof and mouth innoculation campaign, a young educated Maasai complained that, 
while he had vigorously tried to explain the benefits of innoculation, he could 
not convince the other ranch members of this and even the ranch committee chairman 
hid many of his cattle in the bush to avoid innoculation. This is certainly not 
in keeping with Davis' (1971: 25) forecast for Kajiado District that committee 
members "may represent a progressive spirit as embodied in one or two progressive 
members". 
The reasons behind these apparent conflicts between young and old, 
educated and traditional, rich and poor, etc., and the impact these conflicts 
have on the development of group ranching are precisely what I intend to 
investigate further during my period of research tenure in Narok District. In 
fact, I would suggest that a thorough study of the impact group ranching is 
having on the Maasai must take into account how the costs and benefits of 
development are affecting the social, political, and economic interests of 
various segments of Maasai society. 
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Wheat Growing and What's in it for the Maasai. 
Approximately 15% of the land in Narok District is presently 
given over, to wheat and barley, in a 30% to 70%> proportion. Much of 
this cropping is carried on in high-potential areas above the Narok -
Nairobi highway„ In Upper Mau, where land has been registered as 
group farms, families have subdivided the holdings and any Maasai 
interested in grazing his cattle there has been forced out. At the 
.moment, 90% of this land is being leased to Kikuyu farmers on a 3 -
5 year basis. In addition, some individual title deeds were given 
to civil servants, a few of whom are Maasai. Whatever the case, 
.many of these people with large shambas have clearly .made huge 
profits and some of them (i.e., local chiefs, sub-chiefs, and 
county' councilors.) a r e co.mmonly referred to as the new "Wheat Elite". 
Moreover, these same individuals are usually .members of one or .more 
group ranches in the district and some even have individual ranches 
where they raise graded stock bought with their wheat profits. In 
sum, however, and regardless of the .monetary value in wheat, those 
Maasai who traditionally used the Mau as a grazing reserve during 
periods of drought are now remarking that agriculture is quickly 
reducing the long-term prospects for herding in that area while 
.most of the benefits are seen to accrue to "outsiders". 
While I do not intend to carry on any long-term research in 
Upper Mau, I want to emphasize that I will conduct intensive 
research into the nature and extent of wheat growing on such 
group ranches as Masikonde, Olechoi, and Olekotikash, and the 
impact this is having on group ranch development.. It is already 
known that land on these three ranches is being leased for wheat 
and barley cropping and that any profits are being equally shared 
by all members. Even' ^ Iffe this however. many elders want to 
sub.divide their ranches so that, rather than sharing the profits, 
each .man will be able to .make an individual, and perhaps higher, 
gain from leasing. 
Many younger .men (i.e., the warrior age-grade) are opposed to 
sub-division because they regard the profits from wheat as a short-
term means of acquiring .more cattle and eventually using the entire 
group ranch acreage for herding. On the Masikonde Group Ranch where 
there is a registered .membership of 70, there are also more than 30 
senior warriors who insist on their right to .membership under the 
ranch constitution. Up to now, the elders on the ranch have been 
successful in:denying these warriors membership. However, these 
young men have taken their case to the district commissioner 
arguing that because they are of age they should have the right to 
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decide the ranch's future. In fact, the young men fear that with 
sub-division nobody on the ranch will have enough land to raise 
cattle and, furthermore, that the elders would immediately sell or 
lease their land in order to obtain money for drinking. For these 
warriors, there is a real possibility that lower Mau v/ill become 
another Ngong where large-scale herding is impossible. Part of 
their suspicion derives from the fact that wealthy ranch .members 
are beginning to build permanent houses and .might use this to 
eventually claim individual title to some of the best land. 
In light of the above, it is questionable whether wheat growing 
will ever promote ranch development. Very little money from wheat is 
channelled into ranching improvements and .many Maasai say that because 
they did not sell any animals to realize the cash that, "it is like 
finding .money on the roadside and it can be spent on anything". Maasai 
on group ranches in wheat growing areas are anxious to increase their 
acreage. However, it seems unlikely that they see the overall capacity 
of their ranch being proportionately reduced., Few of the ranches which 
presently grow wheat have taken out development loans and, while some 
planners suspect this is because they have access to their oen private 
funds, it is important not to overlook the fact that these same Maasai 
ranchers have not been using their profits from wheat for ranch dev-
elopment : 
In essence then, one of the .major effects of growing wheat on 
group rar.ches in parts of t?:e district has been the increased conflict 
between those committed to pastoralism and those who favour agriculture; 
between group and individual interests; ana between young and old Maasai 
living on the group ranches. Moreover, .many young Maasai even regard 
this conflict and the possibility of sub-division as a distinct threat 
to their cultural identity. They feel that in order to survive on small 
plots of land many'Maasai will take Kikuyu wives who, unlike Maasai 
women, will be willing to .maintain a shamba. Once this pattern is 
established, there is the additional fear that these Qor other) non-
Maasai will recruit additional outsiders and that this will cause 
Maasai customs to diminish. The full extent of the impact wheat 
growing has on group ranches will be closely examined during the 
course of my fieldwork, as will the basis for land use conflicts, 
the strategies used to cope with these conflicts, and some of the 
possible solutions.for avoiding such conflict. 
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Making Money the Easy Way - Capitalizing On Wildlife 
A third source of funding for group ranches comes from tented 
camps. Those ranches with a substantial wildlife population lease 
sections of their ranches to businessmen who, on the basis of a 
12-month lease agreement, establish tourist camps. These ranches, 
Lemek and Koyiaki are good examples, receive some 'K-shs-. 150,000 per 
year from this source, plus additional revenue from the Ministry 
of Tourism and Wildlife as compensation for wild animals coming 
onto their ranches from the Maasai Mara game reserve. 
Because of such a lucrative source of funds, these ranches 
have not yet had to apply for a development loan. This worries the Ranch 
Planning Office in the district because officials there feel that, 
without a loan to repay, there will be no significant offtake of 
cattle, but rather, ranch finances will be used to purchase more 
cattle thereby leading to a chronic overstocking problem. Again 
such a situation begs further investigation but, it is worthwhile 
mentioning here that Koyiaki Group Ranch has already invested its 
profits from tented camps in dip construction and the purchase of 
150 graded steers, against the advice of district ranch planners! 
Self-Financed Development of a Different Kind 
Some ranches, e.g., Suswa Kitet, have applied for a development 
loan but were rejected on the basis that its ranch .members have too 
much personal cattle wealth and that their ranch is overstocked. 
Suffice to say that Suswa Kitet ranch members are not willing to 
reduce their herds simply to become eligible for a development 
loan: Stated differently, the Suswa Kitet ranchers are implicitely 
rejecting the values and principles of ranch development which 
planners are attempting to impose, viz., a sustained offtake of 
cattle, rangeland conservation, and a commercial cash economy. 
Preliminary investigation shows that, for ranch planners, the 
introduction of improved technology is the means for providing a 
substantial measure of risk pooling on commercial ranches. For 
Maasai ranchers, however, dips, crushes, and bore holes are only 
innovations to be accepted in order to further enhance the health 
of their cattle and stimulate growth in their indigenous economy. 
Consequently, the technological determinism which is so often the 
basis of development .models (and macro theory in general) is not 
always forthcoming! Of course, there are numerous other reasons why 
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development does not occur. For example, despite technological 
innovations, it often happens that development is stifled when a 
population is increasing faster than people's ability to accumulate 
capital. This may well be true for those group ranches which .must 
support future generations. 
Hoben (1967) .makes the interesting observation that whenever 
the available pasture per livestock unit decreases (as could well 
be the case at Suswa Kitet), and herd quality follows suit, families 
living near the subsistence level are forced to increase the size of 
their herds simply to .maintain the same level of production. Also, 
the constraints on development must be recognized in that process of 
herd growth whereby each stockowner is involved in numerous sets of 
cattle relations corresponding to a wide variety of social ties and 
that the circulation of cattle among and within production units 
in .many ways parallels the process of social reproduction (Spencer 
1978). Consequently, although planners vow they do not want to 
"change" the Maasai, it is easy to argue that a shift from sub-
sistence pastoralism to commercial beef production is not merely 
an extension of traditional practices, but rather, is a transformation 
to a completely new mode of production - one which may well involve 
organizational changes which, ir. turn, could have drastic effects 
on the Maasai social system. 
Some General Problem to be Investigated 
Keeping the preceding remarks in .mind, I should stress that I 
also intend to investigate cattle offtake, especially the rate and 
structure of livestock sales and purchases. Schneider (1978) has 
already examined the relationship between annual offtake rates and 
herd .management practices. He disagrees with Dahl and Hjort's (1976) 
contention that Maasai manage cattle solely for .milk production and 
Baxter's (1975) claim that Maasai herd structure is due to their need 
for bridewealth, as well as an ecological adaptation. Instead, he 
argues that, because livestock numbers increase rapidly, Maasai manage 
their cattle for profit. He goes on to say that, because of this, the 
Maasai make decisions about herd management as investment'sThis being 
the case, a .minimal offtake of cattle is decidely the best strategy 
within a subsistence economy, while it clearly would not be if one 
were involved in commercial beef and .milk production. Schneider 
concludes that Maasai .manage their herds for capital growth and that 
diffuse stock relationships create conditions "in which the amount 
of wealth that can be accumulated is practically endless" (Schneider 
1978i 24). 
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I find Schneider's speculations particularly intriguing given 
my interest in exploring the relationship between Maasai social forms 
and their production strategies. In fact, I would strongly suggest 
that collecting and analyzing this particular type of data is 
essential to gaining a thorough understanding of the process of 
transformation which Maasai undergo as they shift from se.mi-no.madic 
herding to commercial ranching. As an illustration of this I want to 
briefly .mention that previously widespread stockfriend relationships 
on many Kajiado group ranches have declined following the introduction 
of group ranching and that this also see.ms to be happening in Narok. 
Now, if these same relationships were, in fact, the basis for capital 
accumulation in Maasai society, one has to wonder whether herd 
structure and herd management practices are being similarly altered. 
It .may well be that the relationships between social forms 
and production strategies are not causal. Nevertheless, it is still 
important to determine how significant correlations and statistical 
variations based on this kind of data actually reflect transformation 
of specific structural properties inherent to the Maasai social system. 
After drawing attention to Schneider's argument, I want to 
emphasize that I do not subscribe to his notion that the Maasai do not 
sell their cattle or realize the value of .money. Indeed, if one were 
to depend on official livestock marketing statistics compiled for Narok 
District, he would certainly be .misled. In 1978, for example, the Narok 
County Council recorded 5,250 official sales of livestock from the 
district. However, livestock .marketing officials estimate that over 
50,000 head of cattle left the district unofficialy (and illegally!). 
On the basis of this unofficial export of stock, it appears that 1.5 
- 2 cattle per Maasai family are sold each year, although this in 
no way represents the absolute offtake of cattle in Narok District. 
This is especially true since Maasai traders often travel to Mulot, 
purchase Kipsigis and Kisii cattle, by-pass the quarantine facilities 
at Kiboko, and sell these cattle in Ngong for a healthy profit. Once 
this is accomplished, the same traders travel to Tanzania where they 
purchase bulls for sale to slaughter houses in and around Nairobi, 
again at a substantial profit. With these earnings in hand, traders 
return to Mulot and purchase heifers and bull-calves which are added 
to their own herds. In addition, Maasai often emphasize that even 
slaughter stock is only sold to K.M.C. when a higher price cannot be 
gained elsewhere! 
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This particular circulation of cattle, of which there are .many-
variations, is most frequently used by young Maasai .men who cannot 
build up herds for marriage purposes through traditional stock theft. 
In effect then, stock trading provides these young men with the means 
to join the .mainstream of Maasai social, political, ,and economic life. 
In .more general terms, the circulation of cattle into and out of Narok 
Maasailand can be interpreted as one of several manifestations of 
intergenerational conflict peculiar to contemporary Maasai society, as 
well as representing the inability of poor Maasai to fully participate 
in the pastoral economy. 
Another general problem, which is also characteristic of Kajiado 
District, is that Narok Maasai regard group ranches as artificial 
creations which bear no relation to traditional sociological units 
such as elatia, enkutoto, etc. In fact, Prans Mol (pers. communication) 
notes that .many Maasai refer to their group ranch as "olokeri" - a 
traditional term which refers specifically to the small grassy area 
near a Maasai bo.ma where sick animals are kept. The significance of 
this and other terms which Maasai use to describe a group ranch is 
still to be determined, however, they will undoubtedly say .much about 
Maasai perceptions of ranch development, 
I shovild .mention here that .many of the small ranches in the 
district are family ranches, while larger ones are composed of people 
from the same Maasai section, but are also representative of several 
Maasai sub-sections. In the latter case, and whenever one sub-section 
is dominant, it appears that serious conflicts are developing over 
ranch management. In a few cases, e.g., Olomisimis, ranches have 
.members from three separate Maasai sections, viz., Moitanik, Siria, 
Uasingishu. This ranch is beset with interpersonal antagonisms and 
the ranch committee has asked that the ranch be sub-divided along 
section lines. At Lemek Group Ranch, .many ranch .members, including 
.members of the ranch committee, have already assumed ownership of 
individual plots of land on a ridge near the river - a move which 
could eventually lead to disputes over access rights to water, By 
contrast, two group ranches in the Loita Hills area have asked to 
be combined into one single, large ranch. 
Preliminary investigation in the district reveals that most 
individual ranches have closed off their land to others and are 
concentrating on raising graded stock. Many of these individual ranches 
belong to outsiders, often from Nairobi, while others belong to local 
Maasai who are .members, and sometimes leaders, on several of the group 
IDS/WP 350 
ranches in the district, One question .. which remains to be answered here 
is: How are non-resident members of group ranches able to influence 
decision-making on those ranches? 
It is also important to mention that, in the semi-arid areas of 
the district, ranch boundaries are usually open. Here, ranchers say 
that, while they cannot expel intruding graziers, they do report them 
to ranch planning officers. Thirty such illegal graziers were reported 
to be herding cattle on Nkairamiram Group Ranch while their own land 
was under wheat. Ololceri Group Eanch reported over 300 such intruders, 
but decided not to try to expel them. Similarly, Olomisimis Group 
Ranch has numerous illegal graziers from Nandi, Kipsigis, Kisii, and 
from as far away as Tanzania, but because of inter-marriage with all 
these groups, find it extremely difficult to remove them. Again, since 
these incidents can constitute a constraint on ranch development, they 
.must be more thoroughly investigated. 
Conclusion: 
It is important to stress, that changes in cattle usage, resource 
.management, and pastoral .movement within the framework of group ranch 
development cannot be fully understood without considering their impact 
on Maasai kinship relations, bridewealth, .marriage, and inheritance 
practices, as well as women's roles, especially in those areas where 
group ranch committees are contemplating commercial milk production. 
Furthermore, if capital accumulation is being replaced by deflation in 
the traditional Maasai economy, the possiblity exists for numerous 
Maasai to become disenfranchised, particularly where sub-division of 
group ranches occurs since this could provide the necessary conditions 
for an intense, but different, system of social, political, and economic 
stratification. 
It also remains to be seen whether infrastructural development 
in the district will proceed quickly enough to off-set any dry-season 
limitations or periodic drought and demonstrate the long-term ecological 
viability of group ranches. This is important since the Purko Maasai 
traditionally utilized selected areas of higher ranfall in the district, 
viz., the entire Transmara Division, the Maasai Mara Game Reserve, and 
the forested zones of Mau and the loita Hills, as dry—season graze. 
However, because of agricultural development, etc., .many of these areas 
are no longer available for grazing and some Maasai are beginning to 
wonder what will happen to their cattle if Narok has a severe drought. 
- 16 - IDS/WP 350 
Finally;, I want to point out that research already completed 
indicates that there are several sets of sometimes conflicting responses 
to ranching development in the district, rather than a single set of 
responses. At one extreme, group ranches have been described by Maasai 
as nothing more than "holding grounds for K.M.C." while, at the other 
extrame, some Maasai praise group ranches for preserving Maasai brother-
hood and cultural identity. Such contrasting opinions cannot simply be 
viewed as random and unrelated responses to group ranching. I hope to 
demonstrate that, not only do different ecological, social, political, 
and economic variables have a varying impact on different Maasai groups, 
but also, that one can only extrapolate an overall picture of group 
ranching development in Narok District when responses in one area are 
correlated with different responses elsewhere in the district. The 
Kenyan group ranching development model has generated much interest in 
other countries with pastoral pop illations. It is for this reason that 
.my research findings should have a wider applicability, especially in 
connection with pastoral responses to commercial ranching incentives, 
the general impact of economic development, and the returns which are 
presently being realized within the Kenyan experience. 
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